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CYBERATTACK ATTRIBUTION MATTERS 
UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER 
“[N]onstate actors . . . are able to organize into . . . networks . . . more 
readily than [] traditional, hierarchical, state actors . . . . [W]hoever 
masters the network form stands to gain the advantage.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Day 1: An anonymous online group posts a message instructing the 
United States (“U.S.”) to close all overseas bases within six days or 
else suffer destruction of major U.S. infrastructure. 
Day 6: Twenty-two hydroelectric dams and power plants along the 
West Coast are remotely shut down, severing electricity and phone ser-
vice throughout the western United States. Thirty-five deaths are re-
ported in one day, ranging from traffic accidents to heart attacks and 
heatstroke among the elderly. Reports emerge that an unpowered dam 
in California broke, killing thousands. 
Day 9: The U.S. air-traffic control system is sabotaged, freezing radar 
screens and scrambling information among close-flying planes. After a 
midair collision kills almost 500 people, all commercial flights are 
grounded. Economic loss from the groundings amounts to billions dai-
ly. 
Day 12: A computer-controlled chemical factory in Detroit blows up, 
destroying the eastern half of the city. After reviewing circumstantial 
evidence, the military suspects Russia and China are the masterminds. 
Both countries deny any involvement. 
Day 20: The United States retaliates physically while covert cyberat-
tacks shut down both Russian and Chinese power grids. Oil pipelines in 
both countries are disrupted. Transportation, financial and power sys-
tems are shut down, causing immeasurable economic damage. Reports 
indicate that the number of Russian and Chinese deaths far outnumber 
those suffered in the United States. 
Day 25: After the attacks subside, U.S. Information Warfare Command 
obtains user identification data from the West Coast attacks. The data is 
traced back to civilian-led liberation groups in the Republic of Abkha-
zia. Attackers merely routed strikes through Russian and Chinese net-
works to provide the illusion of hostility toward the United States. 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 
10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 76 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law] 
(quoting David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla, Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Fu-
ture, 6 FIRST MONDAY 10, Oct. 2001), available at 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/889/798. 
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Day 26: In a public apology to Russia and China, the President says, 
“We are all victims.” That may be, but it seems the people of both na-
tions have paid a higher price for the United States’ mistake.2 
This is the new reality. Cyberattacks and information-systems warfare 
are no longer fictional concepts posing as a concern for some far-off 
generation.3 Private, public, and military systems infrastructures are vul-
nerable to cyberattacks worldwide.4 Attacks are not limited to the United 
States, as a great number of countries have been targeted.5 Many of the 
                                                                                                                            
 2. John Arquilla, The Great Cyberwar of 2002, WIRED (Feb. 1998), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/6.02/cyberwar_pr.html. 
 3. Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information Age?, 
22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 223, 226 (2000). 
 4. For example, Google’s password system was the target of a cyberattack in Janu-
ary 2010 that resulted in the theft of Google’s intellectual property. Jonathan Stempel, 
Google Cyber Attack Hit Password System: Report, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63J0BO20100420. In 2009, cyberspies infil-
trated the U.S. electrical grid and implanted programs that could disrupt the system. Si-
obhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html. The United States’ military 
network of “2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks (LANs) . . . are probed 
by outsiders about five hundred times a day.” Aldrich, supra note 3, at 228–29 (citing 
Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38, 39). 
 5. See Robert Coalson, Behind The Estonia Cyber Attacks, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO 
LIBERTY (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyber at-
tacks/1505613.html (discussing the 2007 cyberattack that blocked Estonia’s websites, 
paralyzing the country’s Internet infrastructure and freezing bank cards and cellular 
phone networks); see also Associated Press, A Look at Estonia’s Cyber Attack in 2007 
(July 8, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246 (“Experts said hundreds of 
thousands of computers were used in a coordinated attack against government agencies 
and banks.”); Matthew Weaver, Cyber Attackers Target South Korea and US, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 8, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8139821.stm 
(discussing the cyberattack against South Korea’s presidential Blue House, defense min-
istry, national assembly, Shinhan bank, and Korea Exchange bank); Dan Goodin, Geor-
gian Cyber Attacks Launched by Russian Crime Gangs, THE REGISTER (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/08/18/georgian_cyber_attacks/ (The cyberattack, 
which targeted e-commerce sites and Georgian government sites, “coincided with the 
Russian military’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008.”). It is not just the United States 
that fears cyberattacks from actors based in foreign countries. According to a 2009 McA-
fee survey, a plurality of global companies fear cyberattacks from U.S.-based actors more 
than foreign-based actors. See Robert Lemos, Cyber Attacks from U.S. “Greatest Con-
cern,” SECURITYFOCUS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.securityfocus.com/print/brief/1066 
(“The survey found that 36 percent ranked network attacks from the United States as their 
“greatest concern,” compared to 33 percent most concerned about attacks from China. 
Russia came in a distant third, with only 12 percent of those polled rating it the most 
concerning.”). For the report based on the study, see Stewart Baker, Shaun Waterman & 
George Ivanov, In the Crossfire: Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Cyber War, 
2011] CYBERATTACK ATTRIBUTION MATTERS 1153 
actors executing or participating in these attacks will be nonstate, and in 
extreme cases, stateless.6 
Attribution is the means by which responsibility for illegal acts or 
omissions are attached to the state.7 Vincent-Joël Proulx8 described the 
need for eliminating the concept of international state attribution and 
holding a state strictly liable if it fails to prevent terrorists from launching 
an attack within its borders.9 Although this seems contradictory to the 
United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter, Proulx argued that this notion is in fact 
supported by the international community’s objective of eradicating ter-
rorism.10 
                                                                                                                            
MCAFEE, http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-in-crossfire-critical-
infrastructure-cyber-war.pdf (last visited on Dec. 21, 2010). 
 6. Ronfeldt & Arquilla, supra note 1. 
 7. Amanda Tarzwell, Note, In Search of Accountability: Attributing the Conduct of 
Private Security Contractors to the United States Under the Doctrine of State Responsi-
bility, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L 179, 192 (2009). 
 8. Proulx received LL.L. and LL.B. degrees from the University Ottawa and an 
LL.M. in International Legal Studies at New York University School of Law. Former 
Clerks, MCGILL CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & LEGAL PLURALISM, 
http://www.mcgill.ca/humanrights/clinical/clerkships/formerclerks/ (last visited Dec. 21, 
2010). Proulx is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in international law at McGill Uni-
versity. Id. Proulx’s dissertation surveys the relationship between international state re-
sponsibility and terrorism, with a focus on human rights and international relations. Id. 
 9. Vincent-Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for 
Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615, 643–53 (2005). It 
should be noted that there is no international agreement as to the definition of terrorism. 
Id. at 647; see also Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as 
Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1030–41 (2004) (discussing 
“terrorism” as having an international nature). Determining what constitutes cyber terror-
ism is particularly difficult. See Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and 
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 382–
405 (2007) [hereinafter Brenner, Attribution and Response]. Professor Brenner, in short, 
defines cybercrime and cyberterrorism as the use of computer technology to commit a 
crime or engage in terrorist activity, respectively. Id. at 382, 386. Although terrorism is 
thought of as a type of crime, Professor Brenner distinguishes those concepts in that 
“crime is personal while terrorism is political.” Id. at 387. She then distinguishes cyber-
terrorism from cyberwarfare in that terrorism is intended to “demoralize a civilian popu-
lation,” while warfare is “not supposed to target civilians.” Id. at 387–88. 
 10. Proulx, supra note 9, at 643–53. On September 12, 2001, the U.N. General As-
sembly passed a resolution calling for “international cooperation to prevent and eradicate 
acts of terrorism” and holding “those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts . . . accountable.” Id. (quoting G.A. 
Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 1st mtg. U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/1 (2001)). The U.N. 
Charter is a treaty signed and ratified by 192 states with the express purposes of “main-
tain[ing] international peace and security, . . . [and] develop[ing] friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 
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Attributing responsibility to a state for an attack is guided by two di-
verging concepts—direct and indirect responsibility.11 Under direct re-
sponsibility, a state may be held liable if its direct act or omission led to 
harm, if a group or actor acts as a state agent, or if a state has “control” 
over a nonstate actor.12 Indirect responsibility is more opaque and ap-
pears when there is no underlying link between an actor and a state.13 
Assigning direct liability for an attack is difficult if a state has no ties to 
terrorist activities occurring in its territory.14 As such, the indirect liabili-
ty analysis shifts to a focus on the host-state’s duty to prevent terrorist 
attacks from emanating from within its territory.15 A state’s apathy or 
disregard for terrorist activity within its territory triggers its responsibili-
ty as though it had directly participated in the attack.16 Given the enorm-
                                                                                                                            
1, 2. Furthermore, the U.N. Charter requires members to “settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security . . . are 
not endangered.” Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
 11. Proulx, supra note 9, at 623–26. Proulx refers to this as the “direct/indirect di-
chotomy.” Id. at 623. 
 12. Id. at 624; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (holding a state legally 
responsible for the acts of nonstate actors if it had “effective control” over them); Prose-
cutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, I.C.T.Y. App. Ch., at 49 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter 
Tadic] (holding a state legally responsible for the acts of organized armed groups when 
the state had “overall control” over them). As Professor Proulx points out, “the issues 
surrounding direct state responsibility are relatively clear and require no further discus-
sion here.” Proulx, supra note 9, at 624. 
 13. Id. at 624. Professor Proulx’s notion of indirect responsibility is consistent with 
the concept of “vicarious responsibility.” Id. at n.43; see also Davis Brown, Use of Force 
Against Terrorism After September 11th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other 
Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2003) (“The difference between [di-
rect] responsibility and vicarious responsibility is that in the former, responsibility flows 
from the injurious acts, and in the latter, responsibility flows from the failure to take 
measures to prevent or punish the act.”). 
 14. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624. 
 15. Id. The focus of the analysis is still whether the state breached an international 
obligation. However, under indirect responsibility the breach will likely consist of an 
omission, intentional or unintentional, as opposed to an act. Id.; see, e.g., John Bellinger, 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, Address 
Before the London School of Economics (Oct. 31, 2006), in 8 GERMAN L.J. 735, 739 
(2007) (“As a practical matter . . . a state must be responsible for preventing terrorists 
from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. And, as a legal matter, where a 
state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the targeted state to use military 
force in self-defense to address that threat.”). 
 16. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624; see also DANIEL BYMAN, DEADLY CONNECTIONS: 
STATES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM 219 (2005) (noting the “great[] contribution a state 
can make to a terrorist’s cause [by] not act[ing] against it”). 
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ous impact nonstate actors have on international peace, such a broaden-
ing of state responsibility is not unreasonable.17 
State responsibility depends on attribution.18 Attribution is not only a 
necessary factor in determining whether a state has violated international 
law, it is also used to determine whether a victim-state may take action 
against the perpetrating state.19 Nonstate actors, whose nature and class 
place them outside the definition of a state, increasingly perform modern 
acts of aggression.20 By expanding states’ duties to monitor and restrain 
nonstate actors, the international community permits imposing liability 
on states for failing to prevent acts not traditionally attributable to 
them.21 
This Note theorizes that, within the ambit of cyberattacks and cyberter-
rorism, the concept of state attribution must not be eliminated. Not only 
must cyberattack attribution remain in place, it should be reinforced and 
enhanced through increased state cooperation and collaboration. The In-
ternet provides virtually everybody with the opportunity to disguise 
one’s online persona, erase one’s digital tracks, and transfer evidence 
onto innocent computers.22 In order to ensure that it is not retaliating 
against an innocent state, a victim-state must correctly attribute an attack 
to the actual attacker. Identifying a cyberattacker is essential to determin-
ing the nature of an attack.23 Determining the nature of an attack is gen-
erally the first step in developing a response, whether it is political, do-
mestic, or military, to ensure that it does not violate Article 51 of the 
                                                                                                                            
 17. Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare 
with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F.L. REV. 65, 89 (2009); see also Anne Petitpierre, 
Vice-President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Opening Address at the Bruges Collo-
quium: Relevance of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors (Oct. 30, 
2002), available at http://www.cicr.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5f8jez.htm (“In all 
areas of international relations—economics, ecology, politics, military affairs—non-State 
actors, be they infra- or supra-State, have assumed increasing importance and have as-
serted themselves as international players that cannot be ignored.”). 
 18. Berglind Halldorsdottir Birkland, Note, Reining in Non-State Actors: State Re-
sponsibility and Attribution in Cases of Genocide, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2009). 
 19. Id. at 1630–31; see also Jorn Greibel & Milan Plucken, New Developments Re-
garding the Rules of Attribution? The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Bosnia 
v. Serbia, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 601, 604 (2008) (explaining that state attribution leads to 
significant consequences, in particular, that “the victim state [may also] take measures in 
reaction to the violation”). 
 20. Michael Anderson, Note, Reconceptualizing Aggression, 60 DUKE L.J. 411, 411 
(2010). 
 21. Birkland, supra note 18, at 1626. 
 22. Meiring de Villers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: A 
Forensic Analysis, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 419, 459–60 (2008). 
 23. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 405. 
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U.N. Charter.24 As such, attribution is an issue that should not be cir-
cumvented. 
Part I of this Note examines Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter 
and the evolution of international jurisprudence attributing legal respon-
sibility to a state for the acts of nonstate actors, as it is important to un-
derstand how states became responsible for the acts of nonstate actors. 
Part II will analyze the inherent difficulties in determining the identity 
and location of a cyberattacker, the nature of a cyberattack, and why state 
attribution in the cyberattack context is a necessary part of the analysis. 
Part III will consider increased state cooperation and collaboration as a 
means of reinforcing attribution. 
I. THE U.N. CHARTER ON USE OF FORCE AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DEFENSE 
After World War II, world leaders created the U.N. in an attempt to fa-
shion an international legal system that would foster enduring peace.25 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, the U.N.’s founding document, addresses 
the standards by which member states pursue international peace and 
security.26 In particular, Article 2(4) completely limits a state’s ability to 
use unilateral force,27 stating “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial inte-
grity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”28 This seemingly 
total repudiation of force, however, is balanced by an important excep-
tion, the well-settled principle of the right of self-defense.29 
A. The Self-Defense Doctrine under Article 51 
Article 51 provides that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.”30 Although Article 51 permits individual self-
                                                                                                                            
 24. Id. 
 25. Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use 
of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 215 (2002). 
 26. Id. at 216. 
 27. Id. 
 28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 29. Jensen, supra note 25, at 216. Another important exception exists to Article 2(4)’s 
repudiation of force: collective military action authorized by the U.N. Security Council. 
Id. This exception is outside the scope of this Note and will not be discussed. 
 30. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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defense, it is limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality.31 
Necessity refers to the requirement of self-defense under the circums-
tances because settlement or resolution could not be acquired by peaceful 
means.32 On the other hand, proportionality limits self-defense actions to 
“the amount of force necessary to defeat an ongoing attack or to deter 
future aggression.”33 The doctrines of necessity and proportionality are 
considered to be customary standards that states responding in self-
defense need to abide by.34 
The self-defense doctrine’s core principle is that a state may only act in 
self-defense in response to an “armed attack.”35 This concept is a widely 
accepted foundation in international law. However, the quantity and 
                                                                                                                            
 31. Jensen, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Nicaragua, supra note 12). 
 32. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyber Attacks: A 
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States who Neglect Their Duty to 
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (citing YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND 
SELF-DEFENSE 87, 237 (4th ed. 2005)); see also Ian Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity” in 
International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counterterrorism, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337 (2005). 
 33. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 32–33 (citing Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies 
in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 532 (2003)). 
 34. Gina Heathcote, Article 51 Self-Defense as a Narrative: Spectators and Heroes in 
International Law, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 131, 135 (2005). The concept of propor-
tionality requires that defensive actions are limited to the region of the armed attack and 
not beyond the termination of conflict. Id. Proportionality should be viewed in terms of 
the defensive military campaign as a whole, rather than in terms of the difference of hos-
tilities. Id. at 136. 
 35. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 31. Whether a cyberattack can constitute an “armed 
attack” is an issue beyond the scope of this Note, but is important enough to warrant a 
brief discussion. In order to determine what constituted an international armed conflict 
under Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Jean Pictet determined force 
of “sufficient scope, duration, and intensity” is deemed an armed attack. David E. Gra-
ham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 90 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As international law has evolved, three models have 
arisen that apply Pictet’s criteria to modern uses of force. Id. at 91. The first is an “in-
strument-based approach” which assesses whether the harm produced by the cyberattack 
could only have been previously caused by a physical attack. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The second is an “effects-based approach” which only considers the 
overall effect of the cyberattack on the victim state. Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Relation to a physical attack is not considered at all in the effects-based approach. 
Id. The third approach is one of “strict liability” which automatically deems any cyberat-
tack against “critical national infrastructure” as an armed attack. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). While these various approaches have been widely debated, all three 
models agree with the conclusion that a cyberattack can be deemed as an armed attack. 
Id. at 91–92; see also Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regu-
late the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 185–87 
(2006). 
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quality of force required to constitute an armed attack has been the sub-
ject of ongoing debate.36 This classification problem is likely exacerbated 
by the fact that neither the U.N. Charter nor the U.N.’s Definition of Ag-
gression resolution37 actually defines armed attacks.38 This debate be-
comes quite nuanced as it pertains to cyberattacks, which are often 
viewed as “a use of force short of armed force.”39 
Although the definition of armed attacks under Article 51 is open to 
debate, it is clear that states invoking the doctrine of self-defense have 
prepared for armed attack by states, not nonstate or private actors, since 
the drafting of the Charter.40 Article I of the Definition of Aggression41 
                                                                                                                            
 36. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 31. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the 
Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41 
(2002). 
 37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). An express purpose of the U.N. Charter is to “take . . . 
effective . . . measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
peace.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The 1974 Definition of Aggression was an attempt by 
the U.N. General Assembly to provide normative guidance to the U.N. Security Council 
as to what constitutes an act of aggression. Sergey Sayapin, A Great Unknown: The Defi-
nition of Aggression Revisited, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 377, 377–78 (2009). However, the 
definition was not binding on U.N. Member States and had no apparent impact on the 
Security Council. Id. at 378. Recently, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was 
given jurisdiction over the undefined crime of aggression provided that the definition is 
consistent with the norms of the U.N. Charter. Id. 
 38. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 52–54. 
 39. Id. at 31. Information warfare creates serious problems in the distinction between 
use of force and mere coercion under Article 2(4). Jason Barkham, Information Warfare 
and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 84 (2001). 
Including all types of information warfare and cyberattacks would require an enormous 
expansion of Article 2(4). Id. Such an expansion would require international law to de-
termine whether electronic incursions that may not necessarily create physical damage, 
but have significant economic and political effects, are substantial enough to constitute a 
use of force. Id. at 84–85. Professor Michael Schmitt proposed a framework that attempts 
to answer the question of whether cyberattacks constitute armed force or simply mere 
coercion. Id. at 85. Professor Schmitt believes we should evaluate the cyberattack using 
six criteria: severity, immediacy, indirectness, invasiveness, measurability, and presump-
tive legitimacy. Id.; see also Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of 
Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 929–32 (1999). Once a cyberattack is determined to be an armed 
attack, the right to self-defense under Article 51 would be triggered. Barkham, supra note 
39, at 85. 
 40. This scope of planning persisted since the drafting of the Charter. Yutaka Arai-
Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence—Appraising the Impact of 
the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAW. 1081, 1087 (2002). 
 41. “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territori-
al integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” Definition of Ag-
2011] CYBERATTACK ATTRIBUTION MATTERS 1159 
provides that aggression can only derive from a state.42 Within the tradi-
tional jus ad bellum framework, the international community did not an-
ticipate that nonstate actors would ascend to the level of a state capable 
of initiating an armed attack against another state.43 
B. The Evolution of Attributing State Responsibility to Private Acts 
Prior to the paradigm shift spurred by 9/11, states were not held legally 
responsible for the acts of nonstate or private actors.44 Only acts by 
branches or entities of a state were held attributable to that state.45 Inter-
national law, however, did recognize the principle that a state can be 
bound by the actions of private persons, but only if those persons qualify 
as “agents” of the state.46 International jurisprudence evolved to hold a 
state responsible for the acts of nonstate actors if the state exercised ef-
fective or overall control over the actors, then advanced to hold a state 
indirectly responsible if the state failed to prevent attacks from originat-
ing within its territory. 
1. The “Effective Control” Test 
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ad-
dressed whether the United States was responsible for the financing and 
support of contras operating in the Nicaragua-El Salvador conflict.47 
                                                                                                                            
gression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 
1974). 
 42. Aria-Takahashi, supra note 36, at 1087. 
 43. Id. The law of armed force is governed by two bodies of law: just ad bellum, the 
law governing recourse to force, and just in bello, the law governing conduct of hostili-
ties. Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM U. INT’L L. REV. 
311, 311 (2008). Both principles are based in the moral justification for warfare and are 
intertwined with the just or unjust cause of recourse of force. Id. at 346. 
 44. Proulx, supra note 9, at 619. 
 45. Id. at 619–20. 
 46. Id. at 620. “Since the publication of Professor Bowett’s Reprisals Involving Re-
course to Armed Force, international courts have formally adopted this concept of attri-
bution.” Id.; see also D. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1972). 
 47. René Värk, State Responsibility for Private Armed Groups in the Context of Ter-
rorism, JURIDICA INT’L XI 184, 188 (2006), available at 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2006_1_184.pdf. The U.S. consistently 
opposed Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, a leftist political party with “close relations 
with the Soviet Union and Cuba,” in Nicaragua. Davis B. Tyner, Internationalization of 
War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia’s Folly in Tadic, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 843, 850 (2006). The U.S. used vari-
ous methods to undermine the regime, including cutting off aid, starting a trade embargo, 
and financing and supporting counter-revolutionary forces, including contras. Id. The 
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Even though it was clear that the rebels were a “proxy army” of the Unit-
ed States, and at times were “completely dependent on the United States’ 
support,”48 the ICJ refused to attribute responsibility to the United 
States.49 The ICJ determined that: 
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the fi-
nancing, organizing, training, supplying or equipping of the contras, the 
selection of . . . targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, 
is still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of attributing to the Unit-
ed States the acts committed by the contras . . . . For this conduct to 
give rise to legal personality of the United States, it would in principle 
have to be proved that the State had effective control of the military or 
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations 
were committed.50 
In order to establish state responsibility under the Nicaragua decision, 
one must prove that state agents “participated in the planning, direction, 
support[,] and execution” of armed operations.51 Thus, it became custo-
mary to analyze the level of effective control exercised by the agents of 
one state over the private actors of another state in order to determine the 
level of responsibility to attribute to the host-state.52 
2. The “Overall Control” Test 
Over a decade after the Nicaragua decision, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Appeals Chamber faced a 
similar issue in Prosecutor v. Tadic.53 Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, participated 
in “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims in 1992.54 The issue in Tadic’s 
appeal was whether “Bosnian Serbs constitute[d] a State” or whether 
                                                                                                                            
Nicaraguan government opposed the U.S. support of contras and argued that they were de 
facto agents of the U.S. Id. 
 48. Proulx, supra note 9, at 620. 
 49. Värk, supra note 47, at 188. 
 50. Id. (quoting Nicaragua, supra note 12). 
 51. Värk, supra note 47, at 189 (quoting Nicaragua, supra note 11). 
 52. Proulx, supra note 9, at 621. 
 53. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, I.C.T.Y. App. Ch., at 49 (July 15, 
1999). 
 54. Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, Prosecutro v. Tardic (Judgement), 94, 3 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 571, 571 (2000). Tadic was a former café owner who became involved in Serb 
Nationalism. Tyner, supra note 47, at 854. During the war in the Balkan Islands, Tadic 
reportedly ran a prison camp where he allegedly beat and murdered several prisoners. Id. 
The ICTY prosecuted Tadic as an agent of the state and convicted him of several of-
fenses, including crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions. Id. 
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“[they] were organs or agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”55 
In rejecting the ICJ’s effective control test, the Appeals Chamber ruled 
that overall control of a military organization is adequate to attribute 
state responsibility to “all acts of the organization.”56 
The Tadic court made an important distinction between military orga-
nized groups and non-military organized groups.57 The former has a 
structure, chain of command, strict sets of rules to which members must 
conform, and is subject to the authority of the group’s leader.58 Thus to 
attribute responsibility to the host-state, the state would have to wield 
control of the group overall by equipping, financing, and coordinating or 
helping in the planning of its military activity.59 For non-military groups, 
the threshold was even higher, requiring “specific instructions” to be de-
livered from the state to the group.60 
The key difference between the Nicaragua and Tadic cases is degree 
of control—that is, the ICTY requires control beyond financing and 
equipping forces and should, but does not necessarily, include planning 
and supervision of military operations.61 Importantly, the ICTY in Tadic 
focused on individual responsibility, distinguishing the case from Nica-
ragua, which focused on state responsibility.62 After all, the Tadic court 
believed state responsibility should be based on a “realistic concept of 
responsibility.”63 
3. Other International Jurisprudence and the Shift towards Indirect Re-
sponsibility 
Although Nicaragua and Tadic are the seminal cases evidencing the 
shift towards state responsibility over private action, other international 
jurisprudence can be instructional as well. Nicaragua and Tadic focus on 
the concept of direct responsibility—where a militarized group acts as an 
agent of the state or where the state retroactively endorses the act.64 The 
                                                                                                                            
 55. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 54, at 572. The issue in Tadic was whether interna-
tional human rights law applied, not state responsibility. James Crawford, Human Rights 
and State Responsibility 1, 5 (12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture 
Series, Univ. of Conn., 2009). 
 56. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 54, at 572. 
 57. Proulx, supra note 9, at 621. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. Alternatively, the non-military group standard could be met if the host-state 
approved of or endorsed the act ex post facto. Id. at 621–22. 
 61. Värk, supra note 47, at 189. 
 62. Crawford, supra note 55, at 5. 
 63. Värk, supra note 47, at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Proulx, supra note 9, at 624. 
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issue becomes more complicated when there is no causal link between 
the host-state and the actor—where states have no knowledge or control 
over organizations within their boundaries.65 The only link between the 
two entities is that they both happen to operate in the same territory.66 
1923’s Tellini incident foreshadowed the trend away from the tradi-
tional jus ad bellum framework towards the notion of indirect state re-
sponsibility for internal private actors.67 While overseeing the delineation 
of the Greek-Albanian border, several members of an international com-
mission were assassinated on Greek territory.68 Although the League of 
Nations did not hold Greece legally responsible for the assassination,69 it 
opined that “responsibility of a State is only involved by the commission 
in its territory of a political crime against . . . foreigners if the State has 
neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime 
and the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice of the criminal.”70 
United States v. Iran (the “Tehran Hostages Case”) takes the concept 
of Tellini and indirect state responsibility one step further.71 In 1979, a 
militant group attacked a U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Despite several 
requests for help, no Iranian forces intervened.72 The Embassy was even-
tually invaded and the consular, staff, and visitors were taken hostage.73 
Somewhat foreshadowing Tadic, the ICJ asked whether “the militants 
acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by [an] organ of the 
Iranian State to carry out a specific operation.”74 Finding no direct in-
volvement, the ICJ then considered indirect involvement.75 The Court 
believed “the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any ‘appro-
priate steps’ to protect the premises, staff and archives of the United 
States’ mission against attack by the militants, and to take any steps ei-
ther to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion.”76 
                                                                                                                            
 65. Id. at 624, 627. 
 66. Id. at 627. 
 67. Id. Following the assassination, the League of Nations formed a special commit-
tee to address the legal matters raised by the incident. 
 68. Crawford, supra note 55, at 4. 
 69. Proulx, supra note 9, at 627. 
 70. Crawford, supra note 55, at 4 (internal citation omitted). 
 71. See Tehran Hostages Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 64 (May 24) [hereinafter 
Tehran]. 
 72. Leo Gross, The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures, 74, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (1980). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Proulx, supra note 9, at 627. 
 75. Id. at 627–28. 
 76. Id. at 628 (quoting Tehran). 
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The Tehran decision drew a clear boundary between direct responsibility 
and indirect responsibility.77 
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
The events of 9/11 served as a pivotal point in the development of con-
temporary indirect state responsibility.78 International law would not 
support a military reprisal in Afghanistan solely against al Qaeda, as the 
terrorist group was not the same as a state.79 The United States “sought to 
impute al Qaeda’s conduct to Afghanistan simply because the Taliban 
had harbored and supported the group.”80 After the events of 9/11, the 
United States seemingly eliminated the distinction between direct and 
indirect state responsibility.81 
More than two weeks after 9/11, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1373.82 The resolution provides that “all States shall . . . 
[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to enti-
ties or persons involved in terrorist acts, . . . prevent the commission of 
terrorist acts, . . . [and] deny safe haven to those who . . . support[] or 
commit terrorist acts.”83 The United States made a case against the Tali-
                                                                                                                            
 77. Proulx, supra note 9, at 628. After the decision, it became clear that the initial 
focus of the direct responsibility standard hinges on the individuals or groups involved 
instead of the actions of the host-state. Id. The objective became establishing whether the 
unlawful act or omission of the person or group was directly attributable to the state. Id. 
 78. Id. at 634. On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial 
aircrafts, flew two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and the last 
crashed in a Pennsylvania field. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Cen-
ter and Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2002). Approximately three thousand 
people were killed in the incidents, the worst casualties the U.S. has experienced in a 
single day since the American Civil War. Id. After the attacks, the U.S. suspected that the 
hijackers were funded by a Saudi Arabian expatriate, Osama Bin Laden, and based in 
Afghanistan working through his terrorist network, al Qaeda. Id. at 238. 
 79. Proulx, supra note 9, at 635. 
 80. Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 89 (2003). 
 81. Proulx, supra note 9, at 636; see also TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE; 
RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 218 (2006) (“Operation Enduring 
Freedom was explicitly justified on the contentious claim that the act of harbouring ter-
rorists is legally indistinguishable from the actual perpetration of terrorist acts.”). 
 82. Michael Wood, The Law on the Use of Force: Current Challenges, 11 SYBIL 1, 
6 (2007); see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 
(Sept. 28, 2001). 
 83. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). For 
more implications of Resolution 1373 and cyberwarfare, see Toby L. Friesen, Resolving 
Tomorrow’s Conflicts Today: How New Developments Within the U.N. Security Council 
can be Used to Combat Cyberwarfare, 58 NAVAL. L. REV. 89 (2009); see also Sumon 
Dantiki, Power Through Process: An Administrative Law Framework For United Na-
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ban, claiming that it failed to prevent a terrorist attack that originated 
within its boundaries and harbored al Qaeda members.84 Both the resolu-
tion and U.S. practice reinforced the international community’s new 
commitment to fighting terrorism.85 As a result, the indirect responsibili-
ty standard has become the prevailing view in the area of attribution.86 
II. ATTRIBUTION—GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE SELF-DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
IS OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE 
This section examines why attribution is a necessary part of the Article 
51 right of self-defense analysis, despite the inherent difficulties of on-
line attribution. Once an attack, online or kinetic, qualifies as an armed 
attack, it seemingly gives the injured state the right to act in self-defense. 
The issue of attributing responsibility of private actors to a state is a 
complex issue within the realm of kinetic terrorism, but the nuances of 
the doctrine become even more pronounced when an attack is strictly 
electronic. 
The relatively new standard of imputing state responsibility over pri-
vate actors imposes a greater amount of force on states’ affirmative duty 
to prevent their territory from becoming attackers’ sanctuaries.87 Tradi-
tionally, states were obligated to use due diligence to prevent criminal 
acts within their territories directed at other nations.88 However, after the 
events of 9/11 and the imposition of obligations within Resolution 1373, 
states have a continual duty to prevent terrorist attacks from originating 
                                                                                                                            
tions Legislative Resolutions, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 655, 655 (2009) (arguing that Resolu-
tion 1373 created a binding obligation on states to reform domestic law in order to more 
effectively  fight international terrorism). Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Secu-
rity Council can impose binding resolutions on member states if necessary to maintain 
peace and security. Peter Hulsroj, The Legal Function of the Security Council, 1 CHINESE 
J. INT’L L. 59, 60 (2002). But see Lorraine Finlay, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions, 18 TUL. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 477 (2010) (discussing the implications of Security Council resolutions being 
subject to judicial review). 
 84. Proulx, supra note 9, at 638. 
 85. Id. at 637–38. 
 86. Id. at 638. On Sept. 12, 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368 
(2001) recognizing “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accor-
dance with the Charter.” Wood, supra note 82, at 6. More than two weeks later, the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 1373 (2001), which again reaffirmed “the inherent right 
of individual and collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Na-
tions.” Id. 
 87. Graham, supra note 35, at 90. 
 88. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 42 (citing In re S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
10, 4, 88 (Moore, J., dissenting)). 
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within their respective national boundaries.89 Thus, a state that has the 
ability to prevent attacks and fails to do so ultimately fails to fulfill its 
duty.90 
In his 1995 article, Vincent-Joël Proulx advocates doing away with the 
trans-substantive rule of attribution and shifting the entire model towards 
strict liability.91 Proulx supports his argument largely on the basis inter-
national community’s intent on eliminating terrorism, the Security Coun-
cil’s condemnation of terrorism, and its determination to “eliminate 
threats to peace and security ‘by all necessary means.’”92 Proulx also ar-
gues that because the evidentiary standards required for attribution 
present insurmountable barriers for injured states, strict liability should 
be imposed on states that either did not or could not prevent a terrorist 
attack from emanating within its borders.93 As such, Proulx believes that 
circumventing the rule of attribution better serves the international com-
                                                                                                                            
 89. Graham, supra note 35, at 93. The duty generally consists of: (1) the enactment of 
laws criminalizing international cyber attacks from within the national territory, (2) con-
ducting thorough investigations into cyberattacks, (3) prosecuting those who have parti-
cipated in international cyberattacks, and (4) cooperating with victim-states’ investiga-
tions and prosecutions of those involved. Id. at 93–94. 
 90. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 43 (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Proulx, supra note 9, at 643–56. It should be noted that Proulx’s theory of state 
strict liability does not impose immediate absolute liability. Id. at 656. In order to avoid 
abuse of weaker states, that is, developing countries that may not have the capabilities to 
combat terrorism, Proulx would implement a two-tiered strict liability system. Id. Once 
responsibility has been established on the host-state and the focus has shifted onto it, the 
state will have an opportunity to prove how it has exhausted all available means to thwart 
the terrorist attack. Id. at 657. 
 92. Id. at 643; see also Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of 
Lethal Force When Operating Under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII 
Mandate Authorising ‘All Necessary Means’, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 389 (2007) 
(examining the use of lethal force under an “all necessary means” resolution). It is impor-
tant to note that Proulx’s argument of circumventing attribution is largely grounded in 
policy. He does not discuss the practical difficulties associated with circumventing the 
rule. He does, however, analogize his theory of state strict liability to the domestic U.S. 
law of products liability. Proulx, supra note 9, at 652–54. Within domestic products lia-
bility, manufacturers are often found strictly liable because public policy requires that 
manufacturers be held accountable for their products’ quality. Id. at 653 (citing Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Company, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944)). Referring to a state’s duty to 
prevent, Proulx believes that governments are in a better position to thwart terrorist at-
tacks from originating within their territory, just as manufacturers are more aware of 
potentially hazardous products than the unwary consumer. Proulx, supra note 9, at 653. 
“As with the Coke bottle manufacturer who has exclusive knowledge over the manufac-
turing process, the host-state is better positioned than the injured state to know, for exam-
ple, what logistical, intelligence, police, and military means are at its disposal to elimi-
nate the threat.” Id. at 655. 
 93. Id. at 643–57. 
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munity’s interest in eradicating terrorism.94 While potential effectiveness 
of circumventing attribution is not the focus of this Note, it is clear that 
such a method is untenable within the rapidly growing realm of cyberat-
tacks and cyberterrorism. 
A. Attribution in the Cyberattack Context 
Although states are under a continual, affirmative obligation to prevent 
attacks from emanating from within their territory, the effectiveness of 
prevention is limited as cyberattacks are extremely difficult to prevent.95 
Attribution of an attack and characterizing the type of attack are impera-
tive in the context of cyberattacks.96 Fundamentally, attribution ensures 
that an injured state responding in self-defense does not target innocent 
people or states.97 Attribution also plays a critical role in determining the 
nature and character of an attack, which is the first step in developing a 
lawful response, whether offensive or defensive.98 Attribution in the on-
line context involves two issues: “attacker-attribution”—who is respon-
sible for an attack—and “attack-attribution”—characterizing what kind 
of attack it was.99 
B. Attacker-Attribution: “Who Dun It?” 
Identifying an online attacker is problematic because the methods we 
use to identify kinetic attackers implicitly assume physically-based activ-
ity in the tangible world.100 Cyberattacks do not take place in the tangible 
world, and as such, they do not display the characteristics common to 
                                                                                                                            
 94. Id. at 643. Although outside the scope of this Note, it is interesting to note that in 
his discussion of the strict liability model, it appears that Proulx appears to easily dismiss 
the notion of infringing upon state sovereignty. Id. at 658–59. Proulx states that it is “de-
sirable and more efficient” to sacrifice some sovereignty than fail to prevent widespread 
death and terror. Id. at 659. For further discussion of the state sovereignty in the informa-
tion age, see Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Infor-
mation Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2004); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear 
War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 192 (2009). “Despite the importance of state sovereignty, governments in the nine-
teenth century began to see the benefits of sacrificing some sovereignty in exchange for 
increased predictability.” Jensen, supra note 25, at 214 (internal citation omitted). 
 95. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83; see also supra Part I.B.4. 
 96. Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure 
in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 414 (2007). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 405. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 409. 
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their physical counterparts.101 In the physical world, determining attacker 
liability often turns on a “place” where an attack emanated from or oc-
curred.102 Places, however, tend to be much less conclusive in the context 
of cyberattacks and online attribution.103 
Determinations of attack origin are less conclusive in cyberattacks be-
cause the server location of an attack does not likely reflect the true loca-
tion of origin.104 Cyberattackers commonly use “stepping stones”—
computers used by the cyberattacker but owned by ignorant parties—in 
their attacks.105 While these stepping stones can be physically located 
anywhere in the world, their physical location is irrelevant in cyber-
space.106 For example, the use of Chinese servers in a cyberattack could 
mean the attacks originated in China, or that the attackers were located in 
Russia, Brazil, Pakistan, or anywhere else in the world and deliberately 
used Chinese servers to mask the true origination point of the attack.107 
Until investigators can reliably establish attack origination in real-space, 
                                                                                                                            
 101. Id. In the physical world, attacker-attribution is far less problematic. Id. at 406. In 
warfare, military attackers often wear distinct uniforms indicating their national affilia-
tion and speak the language of their country of origin. Id. Criminal investigations often 
focus on finding evidence at a physical crime scene. Id. at 407. For example, witnesses 
may be able to identify the attacker and physical evidence, like DNA, can be traced to a 
particular individual. Id. This method assumes that the attacker or perpetrator was, and 
still is, physically located in the geographical area. Id. Terrorism occupies some middle 
ground in between warfare and criminal investigations, with regard to attacker-
attribution. Id. Terrorists often identify themselves as representatives of a particular 
group, generally so the group can take credit for the attack. Id. at 408; see also KIM 
CRAGIN & SARA A. DALY, THE DYNAMIC TERRORIST THREAT, 37–38 (2004) (explaining 
that the Real Irish Republican Army and Hamas generally take credit for attacks, while 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and al Qaeda do not). Sponsoring terrorist 
groups often take credit for attacks in messages online or on videotapes delivered to the 
media. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 408. In addition, terrorist 
attacks may be attributed to a particular group based on the structure and style of the 
attack. Id. 
 102. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. The concept of geographical places is further distorted by “packet switching,” 
in which packets of data travel the shortest electronic route to their destination. Condron, 
supra note 96, at 409. The shortest electronic route, however, does not necessarily cor-
respond to the shortest geographical route. Id. Data transfer relies on “existing network 
traffic loads,” and therefore “shortest” corresponds more to time than geographic dis-
tance. Id. 
 106. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409. 
 107. Id. at 409–10; see, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cybers-
pies, TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 34, 34 (“In the world of cyberspying, locating the attackers’ 
country of origin is rare. China, in particular, is known for having poorly defended serv-
ers that outsiders from around the world commandeer as their unwitting launchpads.”). 
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attacker-attribution is predicated on mere inferences.108 Even if cyberat-
tacks are repeated over long periods of time, attacker-attribution would 
still have to be drawn from inferences of what would appear to be the 
same point of origin.109 
Relying on inferences to identify the point of origin in cyberattacks in-
troduces an element of ambiguity into the response calculus.110 Further, 
an identified cyberattack origination point may be inconclusive, as essen-
tially anyone has the ability to launch an anonymous transnational cybe-
rattack.111 At most, inferential data regarding point of attack origin serve 
merely as clues to attacker-attribution.112 Cyberspace eliminates law en-
forcement’s default assumption that an attacker is insular.113 It breaks a 
crime scene into debris, making it extremely difficult to identify the point 
of attack origin and link it to the attacker.114 At the very least, it may re-
                                                                                                                            
 108. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 410; see also Howard F. Lip-
son, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Is-
sues, CARNEGIE MELLON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST. (Nov., 2002), 
www.cert.org/archive/pdf/02sr009.pdf (discussing that the Internet was neither designed 
for tracking and tracing users nor designed to resist untrustworthy users, and how today’s 
high-threat environment far exceeds the Internet’s design parameters). 
 109. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 410; see, e.g., Eric Filiol, 
Operational Aspects of Cyberwarfare or Cyber-Terrorist Attacks: What a Truly Devas-
tating Attack Could Do, ESIEA—OPERATIONAL VIROLOGY & CRYPTOLOGY LABORATORY 
(2009), http://www.esiea-recherche.eu/data/eciw09.pdf  (discussing the main characteris-
tics of a cyberattack: “not only the true origin of the attack must remain hidden, but also 
must be possible to wrongly frame an innocent party (another country or group) as the 
perpetrator of the attack (fooling the digital evidence). From a military perspective, the 
main interest is to avoid or to delay the target reaction by misleading it.”). 
 110. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 412. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 414. However, as terrorism migrates online, the point of origin may gain 
more importance in attacker-attribution. For example, in 1994, employees at the Rome 
Air Development Center, the U.S. Air Force’s R&D facility in upstate New York, dis-
covered that their computer systems had been hacked. Id. The Air Force, Secret Service, 
and FBI found that the attackers routed their attacks through several computers in mul-
tiple countries. Id. at 414–15. With the assistance of Scotland Yard, the investigators 
identified two adolescents as the attackers. Id. at 415; see also RICHARD POWER, 
TANGLED WEB: TALES OF DIGITAL CRIME FROM THE SHADOWS OF CYBERSPACE 65–75 
(2000) (detailing the events of the Rome Labs scenario and what led to the capture of the 
teen cyberattackers—Datastream Cowboy and Kuji). 
 113. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 415. In real-space crime and 
terrorism, a localized crime scene becomes the focus of the investigation. Id. at 417. Evi-
dence, witnesses, and connections give the scene a comprehensible focus and make it a 
manageable task. Id. In cyberspace, however, anyone can anonymously launch an attack 
from any point connected to the Internet and repeat the attacks with a frequency not poss-
ible in the real-world. Id. at 418. 
 114. Id. 
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sult in false positives, leading the investigators to assume that an inter-
mediary stepping stone is the originating point of a cyberattack.115 
The issue of attacker-attribution remains the same even if the origina-
tion point is traced back to a state that sponsors terrorism.116 A point of 
attack origin located in terrorist state would still be inconclusive—the 
state may or may not have participated in the attack.117 On the other 
hand, the fact that a cyberattack does not originate from a terrorist state 
does not mean that the state was not involved in the attack.118 While it 
may be tempting, perhaps even convenient, to implicate a terrorist state 
from the mere appearance that it launched a cyberattack, they are no ex-
ception to the lack of clarity in attacker-attribution. 
Ultimately, the mere fact that an extraterritorial cyberattack appears to 
have been launched from a particular state cannot support the conclusion 
that either state or nonstate actors launched the attack from within that 
state.119 The physical limitations of the real world make it reasonable to 
draw inferences to link an attack to an attacker.120 The absence of those 
limitations on the Internet makes it exceedingly difficult to predicate 
similar inferences to a cyberattack.121 As such, any inferences made from 
the point of attack origin or from the victim-state cannot sustain a con-
clusion of direct or indirect state responsibility.122 
C. Attack-Attribution: “What Is It?” 
Determining the identity of a cyberattacker or cyberterrorist will likely 
be closely associated with determining the nature of an attack, or “attack-
                                                                                                                            
 115. Id. This could have happened in the Rome Labs example. Id. Investigators origi-
nally tracked the hackers to an ISP in New York City and to a group of hackers whose 
members were convicted of unlawful intrusion crimes in years earlier. Id. Given their 
geographical connection to the hackers, it would have been logical for the investigators to 
assume that the ISP was the point of attack origin. Id. at 418–19. In addition, it is impor-
tant to note that the investigators were unable to track the hackers back to the point of 
attack origin through online or electronic means. Id. at 419. They did it the old fashioned 
way—with informants. Id. 
 116. Id. at 423. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 427. 
 120. Id. at 428. For example, an attacker gaining entry to a house protected by an 
alarm system by using the correct alarm code suggests that the attacker knew the victim. 
Id. A burgled jewelry store or bank with an uncompromised safe suggests that the perpe-
trator was an employee, former employee, or someone who the employee shared the 
safe’s code with. Id. In both cases, investigators can infer with a high degree of certainty 
as to who performed the attack and where. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 429. 
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attribution.”123 Like attacker-attribution, online attack-attribution is inhe-
rently more problematic than real-world attack-attribution.124 However, 
identifying the nature or character of a cyberattack is the first step in eva-
luating whether it qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51 and en-
suring that any response functions within the limitations of necessity and 
proportionality.125 The overarching problem with online attack-
attribution is that it is difficult to determine the nature of the attack be-
cause the indicators we must rely on—point of attack origin, point of 
occurrence, and motive—develop an inherent ambiguity not present in 
the real-world.126 This is because cyberspace makes it possible for any-
one with an Internet connection to launch an attack on another computer 
in another country.127 
A response strategy is predicated on the premise that a state can know, 
or quickly determine, what kind of attack it was subject to and what is 
needed to neutralize the attackers.128 This is complicated by states’ gen-
eral allocation of response authority for crime and terrorism to law en-
                                                                                                                            
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 433–34. According to Professor Brenner, real-world attacks fall into two 
categories: crime/terrorism and warfare. Id. at 431. Crime usually involves civilians in-
flicting certain types of harm on each other—for example, murder, rape, assault, fraud—
and is generally limited in scale due to the constraints of physical reality. Id. For exam-
ple, a mugger robs one victim, a rapist assaults one victim, a murder kills one person; in 
each case, the victimization is limited. Id. at 432. Although terrorism is considered a 
crime, it is distinguished from crime in that it seems irrational, in that it lacks obvious 
motive, and the scale with which it is committed is much larger than crime. Id. at 431. 
For example, the World Trade Center attacks were irrational in that they did not result in 
financial gain or redress personal grievances. Id. Terrorism does not develop from per-
sonal matters, but from ideology. Id. at 432. Futhermore, terrorists differ from criminals 
in that terrorists aim to cause as much death and injury as possible. Id. The harm inflicted 
by a terrorist will almost certainly surpass harm attributable to any individual crime, as 
terrorists often inflict generalized harm. Id. at 432–33. Real-world warfare is generally 
easier than crime or terrorism to identify. Id. at 433. A state’s military launching an attack 
on another state’s territory indicates that we have entered the theater of war. Id. 
 125. Graham, supra note 35, at 100–01 (“[A] state may lawfully resort to force when 
acting in self-defense against an armed attack, provided it conforms to the customary 
international law concepts of necessity and proportionality.”). 
 126. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 435. For example, figuring 
out where an attack was launched from in the physical world is much more conclusive. 
Id. The fact that a victim-state believes a cyberattack was launched from a particular state 
is a consideration, but it carries much less weight online than it does in the physical 
world. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 436. 
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forcement and warfare to the military.129 One issue this separation 
presents is that the response process may be delayed while respective 
decision-makers attempt to determine the nature of a cyberattack.130 De-
cision-makers may also misunderstand the nature of an attack.131 
The real-world indicators we rely on to determine the nature of an at-
tack—point of attack origin, point of occurrence, and motive for an at-
tack—are often lacking or unreliable in cyberattacks.132 Motive is a par-
ticularly distinguishing factor for cyberattacks.133 The problem arises 
with a state’s ability to determine the motive behind a particular attack,134 
and becomes especially challenging when no obvious motive exists.135 
                                                                                                                            
 129. Id. This distribution of responsibility is generally carefully adhered to: “[c]ivilian 
law enforcement does not respond to war and the military does not respond to crime.” Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. Misunderstanding the nature of a cyberattack stems from both partitioned 
responsibility and because we generally assume that crime is a “localized phenomenon.” 
Id. at 437. For example, a cyberattack targeting a corporate computer system may be 
inferred to be cybercrime, as we tend to assume that criminals target civilians. Id. at 436. 
This conclusion would further be supported if the attackers’ behavior conformed to what 
we expect to be criminal—extracting funds or personal information from corporate data-
bases—and, as such, would likely be responded to by civilian law enforcement. Id. Those 
inferences, however, could be wrong. The attack could just as easily be cyberwarfare. Id. 
at 437. For example, China’s warfare strategy specifically focuses on attacking civilian 
entities, including financial entities and infrastructure. Id.; see also U.S.-CHINA ECON. & 
SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf (“China is actively 
improving its non-traditional military capabilities . . . . China’s approach to exploiting the 
technological vulnerabilities of adversaries extends beyond destroying or crippling mili-
tary targets. Chinese military writings refer to attacking key civilian targets such as finan-
cial systems.”). Indeed, if we continue with the “civilian-attacks-are-crime” misinterpre-
tation, we may begin to see serious consequences resulting from damage to financial 
systems or infrastructure. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 437. The 
same could be said of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare. Id. Cyberterrorist attacks usually 
occur as a sequence of attacks which may be spatially and temporally separated. Id. As a 
result, law enforcement may not consider that each attack is part of a larger, broader at-
tack. Id. Thus, a response would likely be uncoordinated and isolated, with officers in 
various locations responding differently to a large, singular threat. Id. 
 132. Id. at 437–38. As seen above, the importance of point of origination and point of 
occurrence generally erode as attacks are launched online. Id. at 438. 
 133. Id. For example, profit is a likely motive for most cybercrime, ideology for cyber-
terrorism, and state enmity for cyberwarfare. Id. 
 134. Id. An example of this is the Titan Rain and Moonlight Maze cyberattacks. Id. 
Titan Rain is the U.S. government’s designation for a series of coordinated cyberattacks 
on American systems from 2003 to 2005. Thornburgh, supra note 107. The attacks were 
tracked back to routers in China, but the identity of the hackers was never discovered. Id. 
The hackers gained access to several sensitive U.S. networks including those at Lockheed 
Martin, NASA, Redstone National, and Sandia National Laboratories. Id. Moonlight 
Maze refers to a 1998 “incident in which U.S. officials accidentally discovered a pattern 
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The scenario in which we will be unable to determine if a cyberattack 
is a mere crime, a terrorist attack, or warfare presents the greatest chal-
lenges for the current response model under Article 51, and therefore 
presents the greatest risks of unlawful retaliation for the injured state.136 
Countries that partition response authority between civilian law enforce-
ment and military agencies, like the United States,137 are particularly vul-
nerable to these risks.138 If responders cannot determine what kind of 
                                                                                                                            
of probing of computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, Energy Department, private 
universities, and research labs . . . .”  Cyberwar!, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011). The cyberattack was traced back to the Soviet Union but the identity of the attack-
ers was never discovered. Id. In both Titan Rain and Moonlight Maze we know what the 
attackers did, but have not determined why they did it. Brenner, Attribution and Re-
sponse, supra note 9, at 438. 
 135. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. The motives behind 
most cybercrime attacks are usually apparent—profit or revenge. Id. at 438. Cyberterror-
ists, however, in an effort to fund their real-world kinetic attacks have introduced us to 
“mixed motive” scenarios: where the motive for a cybercrime is to profit, but the motive 
for achieving financing is to engage in terrorism. Id. This scenario has very few implica-
tions in the development of a response and attack-attribution because civilian law en-
forcement is responsible for both crime and terrorism. Id. 
 136. Id. at 439. 
 137. Several federal U.S. statutes prohibit the comingling of partitioned authority. See 
Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA Patriot Act, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1797–98 (2010). For example, the National Security Act of 1947 
prohibits the CIA from employing “police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers” or 
engaging in “internal security functions.” Id. at 1797 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403–4a(d)(1) 
(2006)). The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally criminalizes using the military for 
law enforcement functions. Id. at 1797–98 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)). The 1878 
Act even reflects the idea that the military must remain subordinate to civilian law en-
forcement. Id. at 1798. In addition, the Privacy Act of 1974 promotes freedom from gov-
ernment inspection and the ability to monitor information about oneself. Id. However, a 
narrow reading of the Act could even prevent federal civilian law enforcement agencies 
from cooperating. Id. 
 138. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. This discussion is impli-
citly based on the United States’ current response authority model. Id. at n.277. This au-
thor is most familiar with the U.S. response model, which is considered the most extreme 
model of partitioned response responsibility. Id. Response authority between law en-
forcement and the military is not as rigidly divided in some other countries. Id.; see also 
DONALD E. SCHULZ, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE 
FUTURE 37 (2000) (“As matters now stand, many governments feel they have no choice 
but to bring the armed forces into law enforcement. The alternative is rampant criminality 
and national insecurity.”). But see DANIELLA ASHKENAZY, THE MILITARY IN THE SERVICE 
OF SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE DUAL-ROLE MILITARY 5 (Daniella 
Ashkenazy ed., 1994) (“[T]he military in democratic societies ha[s] not been assigned a 
role as a domestic law enforcement agency, with the exception of extreme circumstances 
of insurrection or collapse of domestic public order beyond the capabilities of civilian 
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cyberattack occurred or the severity of the effects,139 they may not be 
able to correctly assume or assign responsibility to respond.140 This 
leaves open the possibility that no response will result.141 
Ultimately, the United States and countries with similarly segmented 
response models could be targets of cyberterrorism or cyberwarfare, po-
tentially facing dispersed attacks. Such nations may not realize the nature 
of the attacks until extensive damage has incurred.142 Local law enforce-
ment would likely focus on each separate, seemingly localized attack, 
without appreciating the attack’s role as a small part of a larger attack.143 
The possibility that the United States and similar countries could be sub-
ject to erratic and concerted cyberattacks by one or more organized 
groups of nonstate actors is all too real.144 While the damage and loss of 
                                                                                                                            
police . . . .”). While militaries take on different roles at various times as perceived threats 
change, armed forces in democracies are often defensive by nature. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Barkham, supra note 39, at 84–93 (discussing cyberattacks and the dis-
tinction between use of force under Article 2(4) and mere coercion). 
 140. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. An example of this 
would be a scenario in which intermittent, small-scale cyberattacks exploit the gap be-
tween Articles 2(4) and 51. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83. For instance, consider a sce-
nario in which cyberattackers launched small-scale attacks in New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, and Las Vegas. If the effects of the attacks were noticed, local law enforcement 
would respond to each individual attack. The cyberattacks might appear as separate, un-
coordinated attacks and each individual local law enforcement agency might not share 
information or coordinate their responses. Local law enforcement would deal discretely 
with each separate attack, unaware that they were responding to part of a larger attack. 
Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439–40. Thus, where the intermittent, 
small-scale cyberattacks might be sufficient to constitute an armed attack if viewed in the 
aggregate, because of partitioned response responsibility, larger-scale Article 51 response 
would not result. Id. 
 141. Id.; see also Jill R. Aitoro, Simulation Shows Government Lacks Policies Needed 
to Respond to Cyberattack, NEXTGOV.COM (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20100216_5378.php (simulation of a cyberattack 
against the U.S.’s critical infrastructure demonstrated how the cascading effects can crip-
ple networks and illustrated the government’s difficulty in responding). “As bandwidth 
was overwhelmed, millions of infected cell phones were shut down, the Internet slowed 
to a crawl and portions of the electric grid shut down as cyberattackers targeted a ficti-
tious Web application electric utilities use to exchange bulk power service according to 
demand. Transportation systems, the Stock Exchange and financial institutions were also 
affected as networks failed.” Id. Panelist discussions included whether the federal gov-
ernment could declare the cyberattack an act of war, whether the president’s administra-
tion would be forced to respond by imposing martial law, and demanding that other coun-
tries cooperate with investigations. Id. 
 142. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. 
 143. Id. at 439–40; see Arquilla, supra note 2 (fictional, but realistic, scenario of the 
world’s first cyberwar launched by anonymous nonstate actors). 
 144. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440. 
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life might not be as immediate as kinetic terrorism on a 9/11 scale, cybe-
rattacks of these sort could be just as, if not more, devastating, especially 
if recurring.145 
The possibility of concerted cyberattacks by nonstate actors highlights 
the problem with states’ segmented internal response authority in attack-
attribution.146 Civilian law enforcement and military personnel are ex-
tremely limited in their ability to collaborate in responding to attacks.147 
States assume they will be able to maintain internal order with civilian 
law enforcement and external stability with the military.148 We have 
seen, however, that cyberspace erodes the validity of our real-world as-
sumptions.149 
D. Attribution Matters 
Admittedly, determining attacker- and attack-attribution for cyberat-
tack is a very difficult task.150 While prevention is permitted, its effec-
tiveness is limited.151 Even with increased computer security, there is 
little that a potential target can do to stop an assault coming in from 
beyond its borders.152 Nonetheless, the United States and other U.N. 
Member States have a continuing obligation to abide by the U.N. Charter 
with “entire good faith and scrupulous care.”153 This allows victim-states 
to retaliate only against states that have breached Article 2(4) by either 
directly attacking the victim-state, exercising control over nonstate actors 
                                                                                                                            
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. Professor Brenner attributes this to the “persistence of the internal-external 
threat dichotomy.” Id. at 440. Historically, rules that are designed to maintain internal 
order have not been implicated in a state’s efforts to resist external threats. Brenner, To-
ward a Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 45. Internal rules are simply not applicable to the 
character and source of the outside threats. Id. Such rules are significant as they deter-
mine how a state will be able to use its resources on an external threat. Id. If a state is 
experiencing internal disorder and devastation, it will likely be unable to focus such re-
sources on fighting external threats. Id. 
 148. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440; Brenner, Toward a 
Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 65–76. 
 149. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 440. Physical proximity and 
environment constraints, scale or number of “crimes” a person can commit in a given 
period, and patterns of crime in the real-world are not applicable in cyberspace. Brenner, 
Toward a Criminal Law, supra note 1, at 65–75. 
 150. Christopher E. Lentz, A State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist 
Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 799, 813–16 (2010) (discussing “[a]ttribution and [i]ts 
[i]mpossibly [h]igh [h]urdle”). 
 151. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83. 
 152. Id. at 83–84. 
 153. John R. Kennel, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 63 (2010). 
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that have attacked the victim-state, or breaching their duty to prevent 
nonstate actors from launching attacks within their territory.154 It also 
requires that states limit their responses to fit within the principles of ne-
cessity and proportionality.155 
While some types of cyberattacks will fit easily within the structure of 
Articles 2(4) and 51,156 evaluating whether localized but widespread cy-
berattacks trigger the right to self-defense depends on the attacks’ effects 
and frequency.157 Allowing states to respond without determining attack-
er- or attack-attribution might permit acts that would weaken the U.N. 
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.158 Circumventing the rule of 
attribution would allow beleaguered states too much autonomy in deter-
mining the scope and intensity of an appropriate response.159 Such prac-
tice would surely erode Article 51’s purpose of limiting the frequency 
and scale of forceful self-defense to those rare times where it would be 
appropriate.160 
This applies with particular force to cyberattacks as the scope of the at-
tack and the identity of the attacker are usually unknown or uncertain. In 
the context of Article 51 self-defense, uncertainty is troublesome. Unless 
a victim-state is able to conclusively determine attacker-attribution—that 
is, which state is liable for failing to prevent an attack from being 
launched within its territory—it may very well retaliate against an inno-
cent state, resulting in unwarranted death and destruction.161 Further-
more, unless a state has fully determined the damage and effects inflicted 
                                                                                                                            
 154. See discussion infra Part I. 
 155. Jensen, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Nicaragua, supra note 12). 
 156. Barkham, supra note 39, at 80. Attacks in which an enemy state’s obvious objec-
tive is complete and utter network debilitation; launching an evident all-out war resulting 
in extensive destruction and significant loss of life; or a cyberattack that was a prelimi-
nary part of a kinetic attack would all likely be examples of armed attacks under Article 
2(4) sufficient to trigger a right to self-defense under Article 51. Id. Note, however, that 
while these examples are obvious enough to satisfy attack-attribution, attacker-attribution 
remains unanswered. 
 157. Id. at 81. 
 158. Id. at 82. For example, states may attempt to justify the use of force on the 
grounds that cyberattacks by an enemy state are constantly looming. Id. This justification 
would seemingly allow for forceful self-defense at any time if the threat were always 
impending. This runs contrary to the U.N. Charter’s express purpose of “maintain[ing] 
international peace and security.” U.N. Charter. 
 159. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 409. The widespread availa-
bility of computers and Internet access and the ability of cyberattackers to hide, disguise 
their online personas, and use “stepping stones” make this especially true. Villers, supra 
note 22, at 459–60. 
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upon it by a cyberattack, any response based on uncertain or incomplete 
information could result in disproportionate collateral damage or inno-
cent civilian death.162 In either case, retaliation based on imperfect in-
formation or without conclusive attribution will likely result in a viola-
tion of Article 51. 
Attribution is not only necessary to prevent unlawful responses; it is 
necessary to ensure that some sort of response follows. Intermittent, 
small-scale cyberattacks could take advantage of the gap between Ar-
ticles 2(4) and 51.163 If cyberattacks are small enough, they might be 
considered a use of force but not an armed attack significant enough to 
                                                                                                                            
 162. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82. This applies to both kinetic and electronic res-
ponses. Id. An example of this occurred in 1988, in which an Iranian Airbus was acciden-
tally shot down because it was believed to be a military plane, resulting in 290 civilian 
deaths. Id. at 82–83; see also George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1179 (2000). Active defenses—electronic measures used 
to trace an attack back to its source and “disrupt it”—are commonly considered the most 
appropriate use of force against cyberattacks because they employ only necessary force 
and cause less disproportionate collateral damage. Sklerov, supra note 32, at 79–80. The 
problem with active defenses is that they are often engaged while a cyberattack is in 
progress. Barkham, supra note 39, at 82. A targeted state may have responded in self-
defense without first determining the nature, scope, frequency, or effects of the attack. 
Thus, because the state did not determine attack-attribution, it does not know whether the 
initial cyberattack qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51. Furthermore, active de-
fenses that shut down attacking computers could have unpredictable, cascading effects. 
Id. at 83. For example, if an active defense counterattacked an attacking system, it could 
penetrate an unmapped system. Id. Without mapping a system and knowing its contours, 
the operator might not be able to distinguish military targets from civilian targets. Id. 
Thus, without fully determining attack-attribution, the originally-targeted state could 
violate Article 51 and the principles of necessity and proportionality. See Ruth Wedg-
wood, Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 227–30 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 
2002) (arguing that it is more difficult to restrict the effects of active defenses than with 
kinetic weapons because connections from a target computer to the civilian infrastructure 
it controls are less evident; also arguing that there is insufficient time to map attacking 
systems when using active defenses, which could result in broad, unintended conse-
quences). But see Michael Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the 
Jus in Bello, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 204–05 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (arguing that active defenses 
merely shut down attacking computer systems for a brief time, rather than using kinetic 
weapons which cause widespread destruction to attain their objectives). 
 163. Barkham, supra note 39, at 83. In the previous section, there was discussion of 
local law enforcement responding to local cyberattacks which are ultimately part of a 
larger, coordinated attack. This is the other side of that coin—that is, uncoordinated cybe-
rattacks insufficient in scope or character to qualify as an armed attack. 
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trigger the victim’s right of self-defense under Article 51.164 In contrast, a 
series of small-scale attacks might constitute an armed attack under Ar-
ticle 51, but local law enforcement might treat each attack as a separate 
incident rather than parts of a larger attack.165 Although self-defense may 
be appropriate in the latter example, no response would ensue as no one 
would be aware of the larger attack.166 Therefore, in the context of cybe-
rattacks and cyberterrorism, attribution matters. Attributing the origin of 
a cyberattack and effects of an attack to a state are vital in complying 
with the requirements of self-defense under international law. The perva-
siveness of nonstate actors on the Internet and their ability to disguise 
their tracks requires that the concept of attribution not only remain in 
place, but be reinforced. Thus, in order to prevent innocent deaths and 
collateral damage, “getting it right” is of extreme importance. 
III. REINFORCEMENT OF ONLINE ATTRIBUTION 
The main problems regarding online attribution are the lack of conclu-
sive information and the need for absolute certainty. The anonymity of 
the Internet and the ability to disguise one’s online persona create inhe-
rent difficulties in determining which state failed in its duty to prevent an 
attack from being launched within its borders.167 Bifurcated response 
authority makes it difficult for military and civilian law enforcement to 
contemporaneously determine attack-attribution and coordinate a syn-
chronized response.168 However, online state attribution is of such impor-
tance that it must not be circumvented. Instead of getting rid of state at-
tribution, measures should be taken to reinforce or ease the process of 
attributing a cyberattack to a state through increased cooperation and 
sharing of information, externally among states and internally among 
military and law enforcement personnel.169 
                                                                                                                            
 164. Id. at 81. For example, if a series of small-scale incursions occur in another state’s 
computer systems, causing few disruptions and minor damage, such incursions might not 
constitute an armed attack. Id. It may be likened to a state sending its troops across 
another state’s border without causing any significant damage. Id. 
 165. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 439. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Villers, supra note 22, at 459–60. 
 168. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 441. Bifurcated response 
authority requires military personnel to respond to external threats, including acts of war, 
and law enforcement personnel to respond to internal threats, including crime and terror-
ism. Id. Further, civilians have no role in responding to crime or terrorism. Id. This re-
sponse authority seems like a logical system probably because “it is all we know.” Id. 
 169. While this Note proposes that states should be required to share information with 
other states and domestic law enforcement should share information with the military, 
Susan Brenner takes this concept one step further. Id. at 465–74. Professor Brenner pro-
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While there is no silver bullet to solve the problems of online attribu-
tion, many different solutions have been proposed.170 Requiring states to 
share information to conclusively determine attacker-attribution is con-
sistent with the legal and practical limitations of state sovereignty, as the 
duty to cooperate can be found in several sources.171 U.N. Member States 
are already under an obligation “[t]o achieve international co-operation 
in solving international problems . . . .”172 Multilateral informal coopera-
tion between states would not require any additional treaty processes and 
is crucial to the development of international cyberlaw.173 Thus, states 
would not have any additional obligations placed on them; only rein-
forcement of an obligation that already exists. 
A policy requiring internal state entities to cooperate and share infor-
mation is consistent with legal and pragmatic constraints of the institu-
tional separation of the military and law enforcement.174 Specifically, law 
enforcement’s contribution to the military would be providing informa-
                                                                                                                            
poses integration of civilians, the military, and law enforcement personnel. Id. at 465. She 
suggests a voluntary organization to train and coordinate civilians in an attempt to sup-
port military and law enforcement efforts against cyberattacks. Id. at 469. 
 170. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Edward J. Giorgio, President, 
Ponte Technologies) [hereinafter Planning for the Future]; see also Kelly A. Gable, Cy-
ber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal 
Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSAT’L L. 57 (2010) (discussing giving every 
state universal jurisdiction to prosecute cyberterrorists as a means of deterrence); Jeffrey 
Hunker, U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: Five Issues That Won’t Go Away, 4 
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 197 (2010) (discussing improving the governance struc-
ture of the Internet, building norms for online behavior for states and individual users, 
and expanding multilateral cooperation against cybercrime). 
 171. Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, Principles of International Internet Law, 11 
GERMAN L.J. 1245, 1259–60 (2010) (discussing the existing “[p]rinciple of [i]nterstate 
[c]ooperation” in the context of internet law). For example, the duty of cooperation 
among states is found in the U.N. Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on Cybercrime of 2001, to name a few. Id. at 
1259. 
 172. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
 173. Hunker, supra note 170, at 200; see, e.g., Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. 
No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) (U.N. General Assembly Resolution reinforc-
ing the principles of cooperation among states for the furtherance of international peace 
and security). 
 174. Brenner, Attribution and Response, supra note 9, at 469. 
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tion about incidents that might constitute cyberwar, while the military 
would provide law enforcement about cybercrime and cyberterrorism.175 
While states should be required to share information to assist one 
another in determining attacker- and attack-attribution, the rapidly evolv-
ing nature of technology may even render that obligation obsolete. The 
trend in technology is moving towards embedding identification and lo-
cation tags deep into infrastructure, which will be difficult to circum-
vent.176 Eventually, the infrastructure will provide authentication of the 
person at the other end of the signal rather than the person operating it.177 
However, until then, cyberattack attribution must remain in place. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has explored the necessity of retaining the concept of attri-
bution in the context of cyberattacks and cyberterrorism, even though 
some have called for its abolition.178 The proliferation and abundance of 
computers and computer-related technologies has changed the safety and 
legal landscapes in unprecedented ways.179 The widespread availability 
of computers and Internet access provides an unparalleled number of 
nonstate actors with the ability to launch cyberattacks on private, public, 
and military systems anywhere in the world.180 International law, howev-
er, has evolved to hold states legally responsible for the acts of nonstate 
actors.181 After the events of 9/11, international law grew to hold states 
indirectly responsible if they provide any support to persons involved in 
terrorist acts, including failure to prevent the launch of an attack.182 
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Once an attack qualifies as an armed attack under Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, a victim-state is permitted to retaliate in self-defense, pro-
vided that the response conforms to the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality.183 Attribution in this context ensures that a victim-state res-
ponding in self-defense does not target innocent people or states and de-
termines that the response is proportionate to the original attack.184 The 
primary difficulty of attributing a cyberattack to a particular state is that 
the characteristics of an online attack do not hold the same significance 
as the characteristics of a kinetic attack.185 In particular, places do not 
have any real value in online attacks because, although an attack may 
have been routed through a particular location, it does not mean the at-
tack originated from that location.186 Essentially anyone has the ability to 
launch an anonymous transnational cyberattack.187 Determining the na-
ture of an attack—and thus ensuring the response is proportional—is dif-
ficult because the indicators we rely on in real-world attacks—motive, 
location of attack, physical evidence—do not always exist in cyberat-
tacks.188 Bifurcated response authority and the ability of attackers to 
launch small-scale attacks, which may create communication and coor-
dination problems among the military and law enforcement, further com-
plicate the issue.189 
The inherent difficulty in cyberattack attribution highlights why the 
concept of attribution is of extreme importance. The need for legal cer-
tainty requires that states attribute cyberattacks to the accurate state to 
prevent innocent deaths and unnecessary collateral damage. As such, the 
concept of online attribution should be reinforced through increased state 
collaboration and sharing of information. Such a requirement does not 
create any additional obligations on states. It is merely a reinforcement of 
an existing obligation of cooperation. Eventually, the technology will 
catch up with the law. Until then, the concept of cyberattack attribution 
must endure. 
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